A human performance evaluation of airborne-detected windshear display by Salzberger, Mark T. (Mark Thomas)
A Human Performance Evaluation of
Airborne-Detected Windshear Displays
by
Mark T. Salzberger
B.S., Mechanical Engineering
Cornell University, 1985
Submitted to the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in Aeronautics and Astronautics
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
May 1994
© 1994 Mark T. Salzberger
All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly
paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of the Author
Certified by
Accepted by
Aero
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
JUF TFrPItf! (19y
JUN 0 9 1994 1
Dpaitmqht ofAeoronautics and Astronautics
12 May 1994
Associate Professor R. John Hansman, Jr.
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Thesis Sunervisor
Pr4dfssor Harold Y. Wachman
Chairman, Department Graduate Committee
A Human Performance Evaluation of
Airborne-Detected Windshear Displays
by
Mark T. Salzberger
Submitted to the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Aeronautics and Astronautics
Abstract
Aircrew interface issues concerning displays of hazardous windshear are examined.
A part-task simulation is carried out to compare the effectiveness of different cockpit
presentations of airborne-measured windshear. Airborne predictive detectors of windshear
enable the dissemination of varying levels of information. Three display formats are
generated: a multiple intensity level radar mapping, a multilevel, and a single level icon.
Different positional and time-varying situations are presented to experienced airline pilots in
a Boeing 767 simulator using data from historical microburst events at Orlando and
Denver. Associated precipitation reflectivity is included. No critical performance
differences were found between display types. A slight performance gain in decision-
making ability was noted with pilots using the multilevel icon versus the single level icon.
Subjectively, pilots favored the multilevel formats and judged them superior in aiding
hazard identification and avoidance over the single iconic display.
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1. Introduction
Despite great advancements in technology, low-level windshear remains a
significant threat to commercial aviation. It is a problem that has been researched
vigorously from many angles, particularly since the Dallas-Fort Worth crash of Delta 191
in 1985 [Bowles, 1993]. Capable ground-based systems such as the Terminal Doppler
Weather Radar (TDWR) have been highly successful at detecting hazardous windshear
[Campbell et. al., 1989]. Improved VHF communications and experimental work with
new datalink applications have increased the efficiency of alert dissemination [Wanke,
1993].
Recent developments in technology have created forward-look airborne systems
capable of detecting windshear and displaying it to the aircrew in real time [Hinton and
Oseguera, 1993]. The amount of applicable information readily available to the aircrew
using airborne-measuring devices is in most cases significantly greater than that which is
communicated to the aircraft from external sources. But, ultimately, the success of any
system depends upon the effective communication of the hazard to the aircrew. Is more
information necessarily better? Much depends on how it is presented.
Significant research has been done in the field of windshear to examine the issues
surrounding detection, integration, and presentation of this data to the aircrew. The
Aeronautical Systems Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has been
heavily involved in helping to develop guidelines and proposals in the latter two areas
[Wanke and Hansman, 1990, 1992, Hansman et. al., 1992, Wanke, 1993]. This thesis is
a continuation of that work and seeks to address the possible benefits of certain display
designs using airborne-detection equipment.
From their five senses, humans gain 90% of their input from visual sources.
Graphical displays best utilize this characteristic without needlessly increasing the high
mental workload of today's commercial transport pilots [Wanke and Hansman, 1990]. The
proper design of such a graphical display is still open to question. Common sense and
equipment capabilities dictate much. Pilot surveys and previous experiments have yielded
important information about aircrew desires and tendencies. For standardization, one
simple design has been proposed with these ideas in mind. There is still some concern that
pilots may not be getting all the information they could use or in the best possible format.
This study addresses the issue by comparing three proposed designs across a variety of
scenarios.
The main objectives of this study were to:
Evaluate differences between three proposed graphical windshear alert
formats by observing the performance of pilots in a simulation of a variety
of scenarios.
Obtain user information related to the employment of these displays in the
form of ratings, preferences, and suggestions.
Develop possible options and recommendations for the design and use of
airborne-measured windshear displays.
2. Background
There have been numerous commercial aviation accidents costing thousands of lives
during the last few decades. Of these, the majority can be attributed to pilot error of some
sort. Weather-related accidents are the next leading cause and it is low-level windshear that
is the major contributor to this genre of accidents. It is unfortunate when human mistakes
cost the lives of many but it is, perhaps, even more tragic to know that there were situations
where even the most capable pilot could not have changed the outcome of a fateful
approach or departure.
Until the advent of major windshear detection systems primarily on the heels of the
Dallas-Fort Worth accident, this was the case. After a period of intense development, the
field is now burgeoning with proven methods to achieve accuracy, range, and reliability in
measuring windshear, and in particular, microbursts. The short-lived, intense, and local
nature of a microburst makes the effective translation of a detected threat to the aircrew of
critical importance so that appropriate and, sometimes, lifesaving actions may be taken.
Airborne-measured windshear methods are now available, allowing access to a large pool
of information in a timely manner.
2.1 Windshear and Microbursts
There have been many new developments in the detection of windshear, but the
most important factor in safety increases thus far appears to have been the raised level of
awareness in the aviation community and the knowledge of what is involved in low-level
windshear.
Windshear phenomena generally can be classified into two subdivisions, that of
gust fronts and microbursts. The latter begin as pockets of cooler air which form
downdrafts leaving the base of cumulus-type clouds. When the downdraft reaches the
surface, the descending air spreads out horizontally forming a diverging source whose
edges may curl upwards to make tight vortices. Microbursts that have divergences of
greater than about 20 kts over a 2.5 nm area are potentially hazardous to aircraft at low level
altitude, and low speed or energy state [Merritt, Klingle-Wilson, and Campbell, 1989].
Microburst
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Figure 2.1 The Potential Problem of the Microburst
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the unsuspecting aircraft that encounters a microburst,
say on an approach, will first experience a performance increase in the form of a headwind.
On an approach this would raise the aircraft above glide slope and/or increase the airspeed
necessitating a reduction in power. Upon reaching the central area of the microburst, the
decrease in headwind and the main downdraft would impact the aircraft negatively, driving
it through the glide slope. Exiting the core the pilot may have increased power but there is
a finite time lag due to both recognition and engine spool up. A tailwind begins to build
and, if the aircraft does not have sufficient reserve energy, the pilot may not be able to
overcome these effects before ground impact.
Microbursts are not easily detected with normal resources. Visual cues such as
intense rain or curling dust clouds are available on occasion, but not always noticeable
depending upon flight conditions. Frequently, they are accompanied by significant rain or
reflectivity ('a wet microburst') but some, more common to the West, have no low-level
precipitation ('dry') although virga may be present. The hazardous area of a microburst is
generally 0.5 - 2.5 nm in size but groups or lines may form affecting much larger areas.
An additional dimension which complicates the detection of microbursts is the time scale
over which they grow and decay. Microbursts have been known to increase from a weak
downdraft to a strong microburst over the course of one to two minutes [Merritt et. al.,
1989]. Their decay is slower and they usually persist for 10-20 minutes. Locating,
classifying, and transmitting this information to the pilot is a job that must be done quickly.
2.2 Detection of Windshear
The standard technique for identifying an area of windshear that is still in use today
involves at least one aircraft having a notable encounter and the pilot's report (PIREP) of
this encounter being used to warn other aircraft. Improvements have been made but the
aviation industry is still evolving products to meet the need. Because most small
commercial and general aviation aircraft have stricter minimum weather conditions and a lot
less people on board, this discussion will deal mostly with transport category aircraft. On
board many of these aircraft is a reactive windshear detection system based upon the inertial
system which can detect unexpected accelerations. This can be helpful, but its use as an
alert is limited due to its post-facto warning.
Ground-based systems such as the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) and
the Low-Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS) have added significantly to the detection
capabilities of major airports so equipped. The latter system uses strategically spaced
anemometers to detect wind shifts but was designed for large scale phenomena. An
LLWAS unit was in place and operating at Dallas-Fort Worth when Delta 191 crashed
[Newton, 1989]. It is capable of microburst detection only when specifically adapted and
even then it may only be suitable to detect strong microbursts [Wanke and Hansman,
1990]. The TDWR system is reliable (on the order of 85 - 98% depending upon
microburst strength) and constantly improving. It is not inexpensive, though, and has been
allotted to only 47 airports. For the remaining airports with a need, a modified version of
the Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR-9) has shown promise in detecting microbursts. It's
vertical fan-shaped radar beam does not have the gain of the TDWR's pencil beam radar,
but by using suitable algorithms and numerous sweeps, this can be surmounted [Wanke,
1993, Weber and Noyes, 1989]. Ground-based systems possess some tremendous
advantages:
* Equipment power and complexity;
* Time available
* Manpower and expertise
* Knowledge of local weather patterns and recent historical weather
Once this type of information is processed along with applicable pilot reports from
the area, the critical step of notifying the aircrews can be accomplished. This can be done
via verbal radio contact or datalink systems now in work. The latter method allows for
selective notification to those aircraft concerned and can be displayed in graphical as well as
textual format.
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Figure 2.2 A Situational Nuisance Alert: An aircraft on approach
will be informed by ATC of a microburst and an expected 30 kt loss of
speed, when, in fact, it will encounter little change in performance at all.
The potential for "nuisance alarms" is high and can be as much as one third of all
alarms [Wanke, 1993]. Nuisance alarms are alerts about actual microbursts, but their
location is such that they have little or no impact on the flight of the aircraft. An alert to
aircraft is required if any part of the windshear icon impinges upon an area one-half mile
either side of course on the approach and departure ends as in Figure 2.2. The use of
graphical icons on Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) capable aircraft enables the
aircrew to "see the threat" and evaluate its urgency in the context of their flight.
The recent maturation of airborne detection ability has opened an avenue of great
potential. Suitably equipped aircraft would be able to detect microbursts and other
windshear on their respective flight paths. The on-board nature of this approach offers
many advantages, namely:
* Self-reliance
* A display of hazard commensurate with the aircraft state and abilities
* Availability of pertinent information (e.g. exact location, shape, etc.)
* High update rate
Aircrew confidence
Sufficient aircrew education and training is required but this is not without precedent
(TCAS, for example). Crews are already on step with windshear training and would likely
adapt well. This comes with a price -- the equipment itself (reliability and cost) and the
quality of output compared to ground-based systems.
The driving force behind this route of microburst detection is the Forward Looking
Windshear Detection Working Group. Representatives of the FAA, NASA, and four
airline companies worked together with various research organizations and manufacturers
to develop certification guidelines. The document is entitled, Airborne Short and Long
Range Windshear Predictive Systems, General Certification and System Level
Requirements, and the current version is Revision 8.0. The document is a working paper
and not referenceable at this time. However, the proposed standards therein are the basis
upon which certification of at least two companies' products are proceeding. Because
predictive airborne detectors are being developed as an improved alternative to currently
certified reactive windshear detection systems, the requirements are extremely rigorous. As
of this writing, neither company has been certified for production although extensive
testing has taken place.
The system closest to certification is a Doppler radar design that essentially
measures the rate and volume of airflow along a radial from the sensor. This can be seen
by radar using the reflectivity of precipitation in the case of a wet microburst, and dust,
insects and other particles in the dry case. By using measured air mass dynamics and
analytical models, a measure of the hazard level of a particular windfield can be determined.
A similar technique is used for Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) systems, but is much
further from certification. Passive infrared detection systems and millimeter wave radars
are also being explored as alternative detection sources.
These sources have their own unique weaknesses and may miss a microburst
detection under certain conditions. Doppler radars are vulnerable to dry, low reflectivity
microbursts, LIDAR's may miss something under high precipitation conditions, and the
infrared requires a set temperature differential that may not be evident at the low altitude
elevation sample taken.
Visual
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Figure 2.3 Integrated Network for the Detection of Windshear
Airborne detectors need not stand alone, but can aid or be aided by the external
sources discussed previously. Surely, the tools are there to build an adequate detection
system to cover most situations. In addition to aircrew action, action by ATC is necessary.
Approaching aircraft may be rerouted or put into holding. Certain category aircraft may be
able to continue while others may not. The integration of ground-based detectors,
communications links, and forward looking airborne systems into a successful network is
not too far away.
2.3 Quantifying the Hazard
The traditional measure of a windshear hazard's intensity relies on that change in
airspeed an aircraft would expect to experience due to the expanding microburst outflow.
This divergence as seen in Figure 2.4 is only part of the story since this can be over a large
or a small area. The mean shear is determined by taking the maximum divergence (i.e.
maximum wind velocities in each direction) divided by the distance between these points.
Shear is a significant improvement on divergence as a measure of hazard, and correlates
well with actual aircraft dynamics profiles through microbursts [Wanke and Hansman,
undated].
MB
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Figure 2.4 Measures of Microburst Intensity -- Divergence
and Mean Shear: The maximum points of opposing radial velocity (Wx)
form the amount of divergence. This A(velocity) over the distance between
the points is a measure of mean shear.
A more refined measure, the "F-factor," may be determined using the change in the
volumetric outflow rate and the downward flow rate of the microburst [Bowles, 1990].
Based upon standard aircraft dynamics and some assumptions (constant instantaneous
aircraft speed, small angle approximations), the potential rate of climb of an aircraft reduces
to the product of the excess thrust, less any windfield disturbances, times the aircraft's
velocity as in Equation 2.1.
h = v(TD F (2.1)
h, = potential rate of climb F = F- factor
T = Thrust Wx = rate of change of radial Wind velocity
D = Drag along A / C axis (over time), tailwind positive
W = Weight Wh = vertical Wind velocity, updraft positive
V = aircraft Velocity
where the non-dimensional F-factor is defined as:
F =W Wh (2.2)
g V
Equation 2.2 shows that the F-factor takes into account the velocity of the aircraft
and the downdraft component in addition to the shear (g is gravitational acceleration). The
F-factor, as such, is a measure of the instantaneous loss of available rate-of-climb (or loss
of effective thrust-to-weight ratio) due to the immediate windfield. An aircraft with an
excess thrust to weight ratio ((T-D)/W) of 0.12 encountering a microburst with a sustained
F-factor of 0.15 would be unable to overcome the downward force until it escaped the
affected area, or received some "support" from the ground. A typical transport aircraft has
an excess thrust-to-weight ratio of 0.10 to 0.18, depending on weight and configuration
[Bowles, 1990].
Once again, it is important to consider the time scale involved. An aircraft
encountering hazardous windshear for a very short period, and therefore over a short
distance, would generally be unaffected on average as with turbulence. In fact, the reactive
systems for detection of windshear are not even required to detect hazardous windshear at
shear lengths less than 0.21 nm (400 m) [FAA, 1990]. The shear length over which a
hazardous level of F-factor must exist to qualify as a hazard is generally regarded to be of
the order of 0.54 nm (1 km). The approximation is due to the fact that different algorithms
may use varying lengths to achieve the same ends. The detection of windshear with
airborne equipment must meet reliability standards in its ability to detect the shear in
addition to its ability to correctly classify it as a hazard.
The FAA working group's proposed measure of success in this regard is the
detection of windshear with F equal to or greater than 0.13 over 0.54 nm (1 km) with a
failure rate of less than one in ten thousand. To accomplish this, the detection level must be
set lower. The working group has suggested use of F = 0.105 over 0.54 nm (lkm) as a
detection threshold based on the same reactive windshear alert level [FAR, 1990]. "Long
range" predictive windshear detectors must be able to meet this criteria three nautical miles
from the aircraft and with a Doppler radar sweep of at least 25 degrees to either side of the
nose.
With the single source airborne detector, only the portion of microburst outflow that
is moving radially to the sensor is visible. NASA researchers have proposed that the
magnitude of the downdraft can be inferred by use of algorithms based on the Oseguera,
Bowles model [1988] with modifications by Vicroy [1991]. Inaccuracies from asymmetric
microbursts and approximations of the algorithm are still present.
2.4 Display of Hazardous Windshear
2.4.1 Prior Work
A microburst that is detected is only half the battle. The aircrew must take
appropriate action in one of two ways:
1. Totally avoid the encounter area.
2. Avoid a low aircraft energy state by initiating a recovery prior to entry into the
microburst.
In order to do so, it is important to quickly and effectively communicate the presence of a
windshear threat so that evaluation and actions can be implemented. Work done by Hinton
and Oseguera [1989, 1993] of NASA Langley points to predictive displays necessarily
yielding 20-25 seconds of warning. Pilots with 10 seconds of prior warning were able to
recover from test microburst simulations with negligible altitude loss. The alert time
includes 5-10 seconds for aircrew recognition and action time
100
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Figure 2.5 Part-Task Simulation Results: Response performance
to windshear alerts by mode. Reproduced by permission of the authors
[Wanke and Hansman, 1990].
To aid in the process of aircrew recognition a variety of formats have been tested.
In tests presupposing ground-based sensors (and therefore larger warning distances),
Wanke and Hansman of MIT [1990] were able to conclude that graphical displays were
superior to either textual or verbal alert formats. Circular graphical icons were found to
decrease the pilot workload, increase performance (see Figure 2.5), and were highly
preferred by the pilots over the other formats. Pilots were found to avoid contact with
displayed icons by large distances even when at high energy states or the intensity level of
the icon was well below hazardous levels.
A survey of pilot opinion on a broad range of windshear topics revealed that pilots were
most interested in location of microburst hazards, followed closely by intensity (see Figure
2.6). Microburst size, movement, and intensity trend were of secondary importance. A
follow-on study produced subjective evidence that supported the use of multilevel alerts,
signified by color differences [Wanke and Hansman, 1992]. Pilots in this study were
found to abort their approaches at an average decision distance of 4.26 nm from the hazard.
Location
Intensity
Movement
Size
Inten. Trend
Shape
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Figure 2.6 Pilot Ranking of Microburst Information by
Importance: Reproduced by permission of the authors [Wanke and
Hansman, 1990].
A study of windshear alerts by Oseguera and Hinton was done in 1993 using an
aural alert alone, a constant color icon, and an icon that changed color in relation to its
proximity to the aircraft. Preliminary results indicated that pilots were highly in favor of
the two graphical formats. Analytical models of aircraft attempting to turn away from
microbursts indicate that turns initiated inside of 1.5 nm yield no performance gains over
those that recover straight through them. The pilots in this study also tended to avoid
displayed icons even when a straight-ahead missed approach would have maintained as
much energy and avoided possible airspace conflicts.
2.4.2 Alerts and Warnings
Figure 2.7 Airborne-Detected Windshear Warning and Caution Areas
The 20-25 second predictive warning time naturally sets an approximate boundary
for getting the aircrew's attention. At 200 kts or less this is about 1.5 nm which is the
proposed distance to execute a windshear warning should the aircraft come that close. A
warning corridor 1.5 nm out with lateral distance of 0.25 nm to either side of the aircraft's
centerline conservatively takes into account maneuvering and location tolerances [Hinton
and Oseguera, 1993]. The forward looking working group proposed an alert or windshear
caution be issued when windshear above the hazard level is within 3 nm of the aircraft but
outside the warning corridor. Aircrew will then be able to take action, if necessary, before
a warning situation is entered. The different areas are depicted in Figure 2.7. To carry out
the process of ensuring aircrew attention, the windshear warning consists of a red light on
the instrument panel with the words "windshear ahead" displayed and an audible of those
words said twice. The windshear caution or alert uses a yellow light with the same words
and two "attention" sounds.
2.4.3 General Formats
On those airborne systems that will have displays, certain common characteristics
have been proposed by the working group. The area scanned by the Doppler radar is
broken down into small sectors or cells by azimuth and radial determined by the resolution
characteristics of the radar. Within each cell, a local F-factor is calculated by finding the
shear due to velocity differences in adjacent radial cells and applying the NASA algorithm
[Vicroy, 1991]. As Figure 2.8 suggests, the average of the F-factors in cells along a radial
can then be found to assign a value to that cell in the center, the distance covered by the
cells being approximately 0.54 nm (or 1 km). In this way, an F-factor "mapping" or Fmap
can be made. Using different threshold values, a contour Fmap can be formed including
areas of significant shear below the hazard level and areas of intense hazardous shear above
it.
Average of five 200m long
radial cell F-factors
over 1km distance
0 000) 1km
Yields assigned
F-value
Cells form an F-factor
"mapping" which can be g
enclosed in a sector icon shape
Figure 2.8 Formulation of an F-factor Map and Icon: Dark
circles depicted are all cells with an average F-factor value above hazard
threshold.
The nature of the airborne radar makes selection of a sector shape an obvious icon
choice. A sector encloses all cells above a certain threshold value in an area, encompassing
perhaps two or three areas a small distance apart depending upon the algorithm. If the
sector covers windshear above the hazard threshold, it is colored with red and black bands
for display on either a dedicated, time-share, or overlay on the Electronic Horizontal
Situation Indicator (EHSI). An example can be seen in Figure 2.9.
-4- RED
BLACK
Figure 2.9 Single Intensity Level Sector Icon Above Hazard
Threshold: The FAA working group has proposed this format to be used
in those windshear detection systems that use graphical displays. Areas
below the hazard threshold would not be displayed.
3. Experimental Method
3.1 Overview
In order to most efficiently determine the important differences between display
types, a simulator study was chosen. Professional airline pilots currently on active duty
were engaged to fly a number of approaches on a part-task simulator using three different
graphical displays in successive sets of runs. As an observational study of possible
displays and their effects, common but challenging windshear situations were designed to
examine pilots' reactions. The approaches included various scenarios in which hazardous
windshear often occurred but was not always hazardous to the flight.
The general format of the test involved presenting the pilots with a low-level
windshear hazard, specifically, a microburst, on or near the projected flight path. In two of
the three scenarios the microbursts were dynamically changing in time. Each pilot was
faced with a potentially dangerous situation in which he had a limited amount of time to
respond. The ability of the pilot to recognize the location, intensity and associated trends of
the microburst impacted his decision about continuation of the approach. The performance
of the pilots was gauged by the decisions that were made, the timeliness of those decisions,
and, in the case of an aborted approach, their subsequent actions. Subjective results were
obtained through interrogation of the pilots after the runs for each type of display were
completed and with an overall post flight questionnaire.
3.2 Dependent Measures
There were three primary measures of the effectiveness of the windshear display.
The first was the pilot's initial go/no-go decision concerning continuation of the flight.
When a missed approach was made, the hazard-to-aircraft distance at which the decision
took place was also a measure. A third measure was the closest point of approach (CPA)
of the aircraft to the hazard in the course of the abort.
The scenario was designed to differentiate the decision-aiding capabilities of the
displays in two ways. The first was to see if confusion or misinterpretation caused a
significant number of pilots to get into a dangerous situation, or conversely, avoid an area
completely whether or not there was an actual danger. The second aspect, tested in one
specific scenario, was meant to examine how well trends in the intensity of a microburst
were noticed using the different displays.
Figure 3.1 Missed Approach Dependent Measure
The distance from the leading edge of the microburst at which a decision to abort
the approach occurred was recorded to note differences between displays. In previous
studies using ground-based detection alerts at ranges of seven to ten miles or more [Wanke
and Hansman, Oseguera], pilots were reluctant to come towards an area of windshear and
aborted the approach early on. Generally, with the shorter alert distances of airborne
detectors (inside five miles), it was considered better to have made such a decision further
out from the windshear hazard, thereby conserving the aircraft's energy, allowing more
options, and safer flight.
The measure of closest point of approach relied on the pilot's previously established
desire to avoid the windshear area totally [Wanke and Hansman, 1990]. A greater distance
between the aircraft and hazard was therefore a measure of how much a certain display may
have helped a pilot in achieving that goal, although that may not necessarily be better for
safety of flight. Turning within a certain distance (dependent upon microburst strength,
configuration, angle of bank, etc. but nominally about 1.5 miles), yields no more benefits
in aircraft performance than it would experience on a straight-ahead go-around [Hinton and
Oseguera, 1993]. The general impact of an abrupt turn on the ATC pattern and potential
obstacles on the new pathway also weigh against it.
Pilots in past studies attempted to acquire larger separation distances the more
intense a hazard appeared [Wanke and Hansman, 1992, Oseguera, 1993]. Therefore, it
was important to ascertain the pilot's motivating factors in executing a missed approach.
Combinations of the variables, if the differences were significant between displays, would
reveal more concerning their respective advantages and disadvantages. For instance, a
combination of shorter decision distances but larger CPA's would indicate that the pilot had
to resort to excessive movement of the aircraft to achieve the desired result.
3.3 Independent Variables
3.3.1 Display Formats and Characteristics
The independent variables consisted of the display formats and the scenarios in
which the formats would be seen by the pilots. The three display types tested in this
experiment were:
Fmap -- An F-factor mapping using the average F value over a
radial distance of 750 meters to depict two levels of intensity.
(1) F > 0.105 RED
(2) F > 0.06 YELLOW - Subordinate to red areas
An example of the Fmap appears in Figure 3.2. The aircraft is at
five miles from touchdown, 140 knots IAS.
Single Icon -- A red and black iconic sector similar to that
proposed in the draft document by the FAA Certification Team. The
icon encompasses the area of red F-factor, with only a single
minimum level of hazard intensity. An example of the Single Icon is
seen in Figure 3.3. Identical weather and aircraft conditions as in
Figure 3.2.
2-Level Icon (or Multi-Level Icon) -- An iconic display similar to
the Single Icon with the addition of a lower level of displayed
windshear encompassing that of the yellow area of the Fmap. An
example of the 2-Level Icon appears in Figure 3.4 with the same
conditions as the other two display figures.
Figure 3.2 Fmap Display: Two levels of windshear intensity
according to average F-factor values are displayed. The red portrays F >
0.105, above the FAA hazard criterion. F> 0.06 is also painted.
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Figure 3.3 Single Icon Display:
contained in iconic sector shapes.
Hazard level F-factor values
Figure 3.4 2-Level Icon Display: Both the yellow advisory level
and red hazard level F-factor values contained in iconic format.
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New "long range" airborne windshear detectors are required to detect windshear at
a minimum distance of three miles with a view at least 25 degrees to either side. For the
simulator, maximum range was set to be under 10 miles with a nominal detection distance
of approximately half that depending upon scenario. The radar scan for the simulator was
expanded to 90 degrees either side of the nose for clarity with an update rate of one sweep
every four seconds.
Resolution of the radar was assumed to be 490 ft (150 m) in range and 1.5 *
degrees in azimuth. F-factor was averaged over a radial distance of 0.40 nm (750 m), or
five cells, vice 0.54 nm (1 km) to maintain a well-defined microburst for the purposes of
this experiment. A larger distance would have put the hazard level (in some time steps)
below the threshold if the pilot chose to fly at higher speeds, thereby confounding the data.
To avoid noise and unwarranted alerts, individual cells above the threshold average F-
factor level that had no similar adjacent cell were disregarded.
The mapping of the average F-factor formed the basis for all three display formats
as outlined in Section 2.4.3. The Single Icon format used a sector-shaped area to define
the boundaries of the most intense F-factor (F > 0.105) both in range and azimuth. If there
was overlap between two separate areas of windshear along a radial, both were included in
a single icon as seen in Figure 3.5. Although this method was not as accurate in showing
location, it was a worthwhile compromise to maintain a less confusing hazard picture, and
logical to assume that a radial heading that went through a microburst was not a safe
pathway. The same rule held true for the 2-Level Icon algorithm.
These areas of the
F-factor mapping
Produce this Single Icon
g - Black
Red No
on theblack
background of
the EHSI
Figure 3.5 Icon Generation Scheme: Areas above the threshold
intensity on the Fmap were encapsulated in a single iconic shape unless
separated by azimuth along a radial line.
3.3.2 Scenarios
These
performances
displays were employed in three scenarios designed to evaluate display
in a variety of operational situations. (See Figure 3.6)
Scenario I -- Straight-in approach with a building microburst
across extended centerline
Scenario H -- Dog-leg or angled approach with a diminishing
microburst, allowing a safe landing
Scenario II - Boxed approach with a hazardous static microburst
just inside the outer marker on centerline
I I
MB windfield
windfileld decreasing locatedlocated in intensity here at
here at over time all times Sall times Static
increasing
in intensity I
overtime
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I I
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Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Figure 3.6 Windshear Scenarios
In addition to the three microburst scenarios, a control scenario was included
without any windshear activity present. This reduced the pilot's anticipation of windshear
and imparted a greater variety to the mix of scenarios.
The scenarios were crafted in an attempt to force the subject into a decision point
and to resemble realistic situations in terms of verbal alerts, approach criteria, precipitation
and windshear. All of the airports utilized were aliases of actual airports and approach
plates. The names and superficial properties were changed to avoid biases and associations
that pilots may have had about a particular field (e.g. Denver and dry microbursts). There
were 12 separate approaches flown to 12 "different" airports. Of these there were actually
four prototype airports, one per scenario. Three versions of each prototype were made,
identical in all of the salient features including the aspect angle on the microburst.
Of the situations with windshear displayed, three of the runs depicted a dynamic
dry microburst building in intensity, another three had a static microburst with heavy rain
and the third consisted of a diminishing dry microburst. Scenarios I and III had hazardous
windshear with an expected missed approach at some point. The latter was an obvious and
immediate case, while the dynamics of scenario I left room for interpretation during the
encounter. Scenario II had a windshear area that decreased in strength until it was
ultimately gone by two miles, allowing a safe landing. The remaining three runs had no
windshear warnings whatsoever and consisted of approaches similar in nature to that
shown in the other three. These were interspersed within each set.
The dry versus wet microbursts differed in that both had reflectivity but the wet
microbursts level of return was much more intense. The dry microburst occurred with
relatively high cloud ceilings which were simulated in the out-the-window view. The
physical make-up of both types were reflected in their respective data, the dry ones
generally being tighter in downdraft diameter [Bowles, 1990].
A representative approach plate, accompanying ATIS, and controller
communications for each of the scenarios can be found in Appendix A.
Scenario I
In Scenario I ample opportunity to view the developing hazard was afforded the
pilot by activating the display with over five nautical miles separation between the aircraft
and the microburst. A straight-in approach aided in focusing the pilot's attention. The
multiple dry microburst event from Denver was placed between the outer marker and the
landing zone as in Figure 3.2. The precipitation display showed a mild return with
increasing reflectivity over time.
The initial location of the main hazard was slightly to the left of course, three mile
from runway threshold. The aircraft was below the cloud layer and able to see the runway.
This made trust of what the display was showing a slight factor. Gradually, the microburst
hazard built up across the centerline and eventually another cell appeared at the runway
threshold. By then, all pilots were expected to have aborted or made an unrecoverable
heading change. A difference in decision distances and any continuations into windshear
were the main factors expected in comparing displays.
The ATIS information contained a large temperature - dew point spread and similar
ceilings and winds to that reported in Denver that day. A generic announcement stated that,
"microburst and low level windshear advisories are in effect." Winds at the runway shifted
slightly with the development of the microburst. A wind vector on the EHSI was
noticeable inside of 2.5 nm.
Scenario II
Scenario II placed the pilot in the position of choosing between an approach abort
or continuation. The same Denver microburst from Scenario I was utilized but in the
reverse order with one minute time steps. Additionally, the general weather conditions
were less than the actual event to maintain IMC through the encounter. A small microburst
was located on centerline just over a mile from the runway threshold. Indications of the
microburst appeared three miles in front of the aircraft as it descended below 1500 feet
AGL, after the turn to final. The hazard gradually diminished over the next 25 seconds in
intensity until it was below both red and yellow F-factor threshold values. The ability of a
display to communicate a trend in a timely fashion was the main factor that was contrasted.
A typical ATIS announcement consisted of:
"...Johnson weather: measured ceiling 700 foot overcast, visibility five
miles. A line of thunderstorms exists extending from 20 miles southwest of
Brownsville to Corpus Christi, Texas moving east at 15 knots. Microburst
and low level windshear advisories are in effect...."
Enroute to the final heading on this angled approach, the pilot was involved in navigating
through a line of rainshowers such that there was lessening of anticipation when one more
was found close to the final approach fix.
Scenario III
The Orlando event was used as an immediate decision missed approach situation.
The aircraft was required to make a rough box pattern to final after departing holding. It
was hoped that a difference in displays would be noted in decision distance and commented
upon subjectively. This would be due to peripheral advantages and/or the ability to
immediately convey the threat. An example of a Scenario III flight route can be seen in
Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7 Scenario III as Seen from Holding: Vectors were
given to place the aircraft on downwind and base leg to intercept a 7-8 nm
final. The leading edge of the static microburst was located just inside of
MIXIN.
3.3.3 Test Matrix
Table 3.1 Order of Displays by Subject: Each subject had three
sets of runs, one for each display type. Within each set were four scenarios
for a total of 12 runs.
SUBJECT #
S 1 2 3 4 5 6
E 1 Single Fmap Single 2-Level 2-Level Fmap
T 2 2-Level Single Fmap Single Fmap 2-Level
# 3 Fmap 2-Level 2-Level Fmap Single Single
The three display types were counterbalanced across the four scenarios, requiring
six experimental subjects with 12 runs per session. The scenarios and the versions of each
scenario were chosen at random without replacement using a table of random numbers and
various stocks/futures prices for initial points. The resulting order of displays can be seen
in Table 3.1 as well as an example one subject's session in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Total Run Order of Subject #1
(Scenario "0" signifies an approach without windshear.)
Display Type Scenario Version
Single Icon I -- Straight-in, 2 -- Anamary Airport
Increasing MB
III -- Boxed approach, 1 -- Murmanburg Airport
Static MB
0 -- No MB 1 -- Billson County
Airport (Angled)
II -- Angled Approach, 1 -- Johnson Airport
Decreasing MB
2-Level Icon I 3
II 2
III 3
0 3
Fmap 0 2
I 1
II 3
III 2
4. Experimental Protocol
4.1 Equipment and Facilities
The design of the experiment centered around use of MIT's Advanced Cockpit Part-
Task Simulator. Since the focus of the experiment was on the decision-making process
and not on the mechanics of flying (through windshear, for example), the use of a part-task
simulator was deemed acceptable. The simulator's modern "glass cockpit" design allowed
incorporation of the elements of forward-looking airborne windshear displays into the
pilot's instrument panel without deviating from the familiar.
MIT ADVANCED COCKPIT SIMULATOR
INDIGO ELAN 4000
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Figure 4.1 MIT's Advanced Cockpit Simulator
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The simulator consisted of the flight display of instruments, status and warning
lights and the external controls. The external devices available to the pilot included a
Boeing 737-400 Mode Control Panel (MCP), flap and gear controls, a navigation control
panel and a sidestick for manual flight as shown in Figure 4.1. The bulk of the approach
was accomplished using the autopilot through MCP control. Pressing a button on the
sidestick disengaged the autopilot and allowed manual flight. The sidestick was employed
only in the case of a go-around. The use of the autopilot in the initial phase of the approach
assured that all pilots viewed the same weather scenario.
The flight instrumentation depicted an electronic attitude direction indicator with
appropriate altitude and airspeed information to serve as a primary flight display (PFD).
The windshear information appeared on the electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI)
with flight path and navigation symbols overlaid. The normal range control selections of
10, 20, 40 nm, etc. were available.
Figure 4.2 Instrument Panel as Depicted on Computer Workstation
The precipitation or weather reflectivity radar display was a separate display to
remove confounding factors concerning combined weather and microburst displays and to
maintain consistency across pilots of all airframes. This display scope was slaved in range
to the EHSI. A wind vector also appeared on the electronic horizontal situation indicator
for local wind speeds greater than 15 knots. An out-the-window view was present,
essentially affording the assessment of IMC/VMC status and whether the airport was in
sight. No visual cues of windshear were available in the visual display. Other necessary
elements such as flaps and gear indications, warning lights, etc. were also present (see
Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
AUDIBLE
R"Windshear ahead
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Yellow iN EAR (2 alert sounds)
Figure 4.3 Instrument Panel Windshear Warning Lights:
Necessary visual and audible alert and warning to call pilot's attention to the
windshear situation. Reactive windshear sensors enunciated by voice and
light on PFD.
The central control of the simulator resided in software processed by a Silicon
Graphics Indigo workstation. This was, in turn, hooked up to a Silicon Graphics IRIS 4D
graphics workstation and an IBM 386 to act as the flight management system and to
process inputs from external devices. The Indigo performed the bulk of the work by
controlling the flight dynamics, displays and the extensive processing of raw weather
information. The flexibility of the MIT Advanced Cockpit Simulator due to its "ground-
up" software design allowed for numerous configurations changes. Software to calculate,
update and realistically present microburst and precipitation information was developed
expressly for the purpose of this experiment.**
** The credit for the majority of this work belongs to Craig Wanke, PhD 1993.
4.2 Microburst and Precipitation Data
The windshear scenarios in this experiment incorporated the use of Doppler radar
field data and analytical simulation from two historical microburst events**. These data
served as a realistic basis for the calculation of F-factor and its subsequent display in the
graphical formats tested. Additionally, the actual effects of the windfield on the aircraft
could be approximated by inclusion of the appropriate terms in the aircraft dynamics
equations. The accompanying reflectivity was also used, lending fidelity to the
precipitation radar display as well.
The windfield data from the July 11, 1988 windshear event at Denver-Stapleton
Airport was generated through the TASS (Terminal Area Simulation System) of NASA
[Proctor, 1987]. Four time steps of this dry multi-microburst event were utilized as a
group. The second source of data was from Triple Doppler Radar data recorded by MIT's
Lincoln Lab of a July 7, 1990 event in Orlando. A single snapshot of this wet microburst
with heavy rainfall was used. In order to be able to process this data as an airborne
Doppler radar with its inherent limitations, the vertical component of the microburst
windfield was estimated using the Oseguera-Bowles Model [1988] with modifications by
Vicroy [1991]. The windfield and reflectivity data were interpolated between time steps
and between altitudes to yield estimated values in respect to aircraft time and position.
Recent work by Dr. Craig Wanke was central to the integration of all resources.
The time steps from the July 11, 1988 event were two minutes apart. In order to
accentuate the dynamics of the microburst, they were used at 30 seconds apart in the case
of the building microburst, and one minute apart in the opposite order for a diminishing
microburst. Ultimately, the winds were decreased further in the second case since no more
time steps were available. This was not a direct replay of recorded events. At any one
time, the displays presented actual raw weather data consistent with observed microbursts.
Two sets of precipitation were displayed on the weather display. The first was the
actual reflectivity which accompanied the microburst windfield. In addition, secondary
non-microburst precipitation cells were included in graphics files modeled on the shapes,
** This was only possible due to the work of several researchers [Proctor, 1987, Oseguera and Bowles,
1988, Vicroy, 1991, Wanke, 1993, Lincoln Lab, MIT] and a powerful computer.
sizes and intensities of the various windfield reflectivities. Combining the two sources
reduced a subject's ability to predict the hazardous area a priori and provided practical
distractions enroute. An example can be seen in Figures 4.4.
Figure 4.4 Reflectivity from Scenario II: As seen approaching the
IAF on a 20 nm display. The return in the upper left is reflectivity from the
microburst location.
4.3 Subject Selection
Six volunteer subjects participated in the study during a three week period in
March-April 1994. All six were current airline pilots qualified in a variety of aircraft types
with an average flight experience of 8500 hours. All had flown the Boeing 757/767 at
some point and were using the "glass cockpit" in their current aircraft model. Three other
pilots had participated in preliminary runs and evaluations and were similarly qualified.
Information on their experience level can be seen in Table 4.1. Four of the six estimated
their regular flying duties to include areas known for thunderstorms and windshear more
than 10% of the time. All had experienced moderate low level windshear and five had been
in a severe low level windshear situation at least once.
Table 4.1 Subject Experience Summary
Average Age 44.6 years old
Average Total Flight Time 8500 hours
Flight Qualification 4 Captains** / 2 First Officers
Number Having Experienced 5
Severe Low Level Windshear
Number Having Penetrated a 0
Known Microburst
** One captain had been in that status for only four days
4.4 Experimental Procedure
At the beginning of each experimental session, the pilot was given an initial briefing
on the characteristics of microbursts and the development of the F-factor as a measure of
hazard intensity. The process of determining areas of hazardous windshear and the three
different methods of presenting such windshear were outlined. The designated alert areas
and required alarms as proposed by the forward looking windshear working group were
described (see Section 2.4.2). At this time, the pilot was introduced to the workings of the
simulator with an explanation of specific features he may have found different from the
actual cockpit. The physical operation of the simulator was described and he was then
given two (or more, as required) training approaches to Logan Airport in the different
modes of control.
When the subject felt familiar with the system, he was given the four approach
plates for the first set of runs and informed of the windshear display format he would be
using (see Appendix A for approach plates). A demonstration of the scheduled format was
shown to the pilot accompanied by the associated weather, alerts and warnings. The in-situ
reactive windshear warning, audible and visual, was also demonstrated. Penetration of
windshear in the demonstration flight was done to activate the in-situ warning and to
demonstrate the negative effects on an approach. This was repeated as necessary until all
the pilot's questions were answered.
The initial aircraft position was 10 nm outside either the initial approach fix (IAF) or
the holding fix as dictated by the scenario. The aircraft faced the direction of the airport and
the pilot was given an opportunity at the start of each run to familiarize himself with the
weather situation and approach path as would be the case on an actual approach. An
Airport Terminal Information Service (ATIS) briefing was given and the flight started with
the aircraft at altitude, in a clean configuration, 250 kts. Examples of the text of such a
message can be found in Section 3.3.2.
All verbal alerts of weather and windshear given by the experimenter acting as an
ATC controller were consistent within each scenario and relatively generic. Requests for
additional information resulted in similar windshear advisories and an up-to-date weather
report as depicted on the precipitation scope.
The pilot executed the final portion of the approach in accordance with the approach
procedures, ultimately intercepting the ILS localizer for an autopilot coupled approach.
Prior to that point, he was expected to fly according to the filed flight plan unless given
vectors or in need of a weather deviation. The preset navigation plan was flown
automatically and adjusted through the navigation and mode control panels. The use of the
heading select mode was available. Weather deviations and requested turns were allowed
outside of the turn to final. If the pilot elected to execute a missed approach he was
instructed to do so manually.
After each set of four runs, display ratings were solicited and the next display
format was demonstrated. One researcher acted as the controller for the course of the
approach. The high workload environment of the approach phase was partially emulated
by the lack of a second pilot for communications, etc. and (a MCP speed control that
required a little extra effort to adjust due to a slow update rate) or (particular simulator
control requirements).
4.5 Data Sources
The actions taken by the pilot during flight were recorded on the simulator while
appropriate numerical data was stored in files for analysis. The instrument display was
videotaped along with all audibles by the pilot and controller. In order to add insight into
the cognitive process behind the results, pilots were asked to articulate what they were
thinking throughout the approach as if they were explaining to a new crew member or
thinking aloud. Additionally, after each set of four runs, they were given a chance to rate
from 1 (Poor) to 4 (Excellent) the display's effectiveness across a number of categories
(see Appendix B). At the end of the session the pilots were asked to rank the three displays
across those same categories, compare them in certain situations, compare them as pairs,
and offer suggestions. Three of the comparisons were done on a 17 point scale between
each pair of displays. Using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP, see Appendix C), a
quantitative preference scale for all three could then be determined from the paired
comparisons of the three display types.
5. Experimental Results
Three objective measures were investigated: the missed approach decision, the
distance at which such a decision was made, and the closest point of approach to the
hazard. The latter two depended upon the pilot executing an abort as was expected in at
least six of the runs due to the placement of hazardous windshear. The compiled results of
all the runs can be seen in Appendix D.
Subjectively, pilots rated and ranked the display formats over eight categories.
They also were asked to compare each pair of displays on a 17 point gradation scale for
input to the AHP preference determination. The responses can be found in Appendix C
while an overview and discussion of these results follow in Sections 5.5 to 5.6.
5.1 Consideration of Data
The windshear display data associated with Scenario II was not evaluated because
all pilots elected to make a missed approach prior to the max range of the sensor. In the
case of this Orlando microburst, the extremely heavy precipitation associated with the
windfield was enough in itself to enable pilots to make a decision to go missed approach.
Since weather could be scanned essentially from holding and at a generally greater distance,
the pilots anticipated such a decision without regard to windshear display.
5.2 Missed Approach Decision
Table 5.1 Scenario I Missed Approach Decision and
Technique: In this scenario depicting a building hazardous microburst,
pilots using all three display formats elected to execute a missed approach
on each run. Five of six went straight on the abort using each display.
Sc I F-Factor Mapping Single Level Icon 2-Level Icon
Subj# Run# Abort Strt/Turn Run# Abort Strt/Turn Run# Abort Strt/Turn
1 10 Yes Straight 1 Yes Straight 5 Yes Straight
2 1 Yes Straight 7 Yes RT Turn 9 Yes RT Turn
3 5 Yes Straight 4 Yes Straight 9 Yes Straight
4 9 Yes Straight 7 Yes Straight 2 Yes Straight
5 8 Yes RT Turn 10 Yes Straight 1 Yes Straight
6 1 Yes Straight 9 Yes Straight 7 Yes Straight
Within all the windshear scenarios the possibility for an aborted approach existed.
All pilots chose to execute a missed approach in Scenarios I and III where a hazardous
microburst either persisted or continued to build on the flight path. Pilots eventually
recognized the threat and responded accordingly (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.2 Scenario II Missed Approach Decision and
Technique: Not all pilots chose to abort the approach, yet no distinct
pattern appears between display formats. The same is true of their
windshear avoidance tactics.
Sc II F-Factor Mapping Single Level Icon 2-Level Icon
Appr Appr Appr
Subj# Run# Abort Str/Turn Run# Abort Strt/Turn Run# Abort Str/Turn
1 11 Yes Straight 4 No 6 Yes Straight
2 3 No 6 Yes LT Turn 11 No
3 7 No 1 Yes Straight 10 No
4 11 Yes Straight 8 Yes Straight 3 Yes LT Turn
5 5 Yes RT Turn 11 No 2 Yes RT Turn
6 3 Yes LT Turn 11 No 6 No
Scenario II had a diminishing windfield that could be safely negotiated if the trend
was noted. The results shown in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 indicate the decision to execute
a missed approach in Scenario II was evenly distributed among the pilots and display
types. There appeared to be no observed tendency to abort the approach more or less often
using a certain display.
1 = Abort,
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Figure 5.1 Scenario II Missed Approach Decisions
5.3 Missed Approach Strategy / Closest Point of Approach to MB
As shown in Table 5.1, the missed approach strategy used by pilots in
Scenario I was primarily a straight-ahead go-around. Five of the six pilots in each display
mode went straight off the missed approach. There was no discernible difference between
performances of pilots in relation to the windshear display employed.
Figure 5.2 Missed Approach Strategy in Scenario I: Five of six
pilots went straight on the aborted approach using each of the windshear
display modes, only one turned away.
This result is further validated by the lack of a pattern in the case of Scenario II
missed approach techniques seen in Table 5.2. Here, pilots in half of the ten missed
approaches entered an avoidance turn away from the windshear area. Still, no display had
a significantly larger number of turns or straight-ahead aborts than the other two.
The difference in the percentage of missed approach microburst avoidance turns
between Scenarios I and II is likely due to the extent of the windshear situation portrayed.
The area affected in Scenario I was extensive and eventually covered portions on both sides
of the glide path, building from left to right in the main cell. The direction of build up
probably accounts for the right turns used despite the location of holding off to the left.
The threatening microburst of Scenario II was much more isolated and localized, making a
turn to avoid it a relatively simple matter. Pilots who chose the straight-ahead strategy
usually executed the airline windshear recommendations in terms of pull-up angle and
configuration changes while this was not necessarily true in all the turning cases. Three of
the five began the missed approach procedure as in a normal go-around. But, once again,
no display-related differences were noted.
5.4 Decision Distance
To evaluate the effectiveness of the candidate windshear displays in regard to
decision distance, it was necessary to consider the data generated on two levels. The
scored levels of each display were statistically compared to find out what the absolute
differences might be between the formats. To complement this approach, a non-parametric
analysis of the data was also completed. It is important to remember that decision distances
were calculated from the aircraft to the leading edge and not the center of the closest
threatening microburst.
5.4.1 Parametric Testing
The variations in hazard criteria and decision-making ability of the individual pilots
were taken into account by testing within subjects. In Scenario I all pilots eventually chose
to abort the approach. There was, therefore, a full data set for such a test, as seen in Table
5.3.
Table 5.3 Scenario I Abort Decision Distances in Nautical Miles
Subj# Fmap Single Icon 2-Level
Icon
1 3.0 1.2 2.0
2 1.2 1.3 2.5
3 2.0 1.2 1.3
4 2.1 3.1 0.7
5 1.0 2.0 2.4
6 1.2 1.7 2.2
Ave 1.75 nm 1.75 nm 1.85 nm
Std Dev 0.76 0.73 0.71
Table 5.3 shows the results of an analysis of variance taken within subjects on the
data. The negligible F-ratio and the obvious equivalence of means in Table 5.4 and Figure
5.3 indicate that there is no significant difference readily apparent. The P-Value of 0.97
indicates that the probability that the differences could have been due to chance is almost
1.0. In comparing the distances in the table, the data from subject number four seemed out
of place and was, perhaps, an outlier. Another ANOVA was performed without subject
four but the probability due to chance was still approximately 80% with a slight but
insignificant rise in F-Value. The differences between display types in absolute terms were
indistinguishable on this level.
Table 5.4 Type III Sums of Squares of Scenario I Decision Distances
Degrees of Sum of Mean
Source Freedom Squares Square F-Value P-Value
Subject 5 .645 .129
Display 2 .040 .020 .027 .9736
Display * Subject 10 7.460 .746
2Fmap Single Icon 2-Level Icon
Display Type
Figure 5.3 Means of Decision Distances in Scenario I
5.4.2 Non-parametric Comparisons
Despite the apparent equivalence of the data among means and variances, it was
noticed that there was a relative trend between display types. A nonparametric sign test
was conducted on the same data. Comparing the signs of the difference between each pair
of results (Fmap-Single Icon, Fmap - 2-Level Icon, 2-Level Icon - Single Icon), enabled
distributions to be disregarded. It was noted that the 2-Level Iconic display produced
decision distances for each subject that were greater than that of the Single Icon in five of
the six cases (see Figure 5.4). The result is significant using a non-parametric sign test at
approximately the 10% level. Eliminating subject number four here showed all five of the
2-Level Icon approaches being aborted at a greater distance, albeit with a lower sample
size. No such significance was found in the other two combinations of displays in regard
to decision distance.
2.0
1.0
0 0 I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6
-lO
< -2.0
-3.0
Subject #
Figure 5.4 Difference in Decision Distances Using 2-Level vs.
Single Icon Format by Subject: Subject number four appears to be
an outlier.
The nonparametric test method is more robust, although slightly less efficient, for
a sample distributed normally. Constricted by the small sample size, another version of
this approach, the rank test, was explored including Scenario II decision distances. By
taking all the decision distances using the three displays and sorting them into descending
order, a nonparametric rank test determined the significance of having a certain number of
distances from the 2-Level Icon pool greater than that of the Single Icon. The resulting
values reflected sample size.
Subject
-- 1.- - Subject
Number 4
0.0
4 52-Level Icon
6 Single Icon
9
Figure 5.5 Decision Distances of Two Display Types in
Scenarios I & II: Seven out of nine 2-Level Icon decision distances are
greater than that of the Single Icon. If subject number four is removed as an
outlier, the 100% consistency in rank comparison is significant.
The results in Figure 5.5 show seven out of the nine pairs have greater values for
the 2-Level Icon than the Single Icon at corresponding rank -- significant at the 10% level.
The performance of subject number four occupies both the highest and lowest points
indicated overall. These distances are singularly two or more standard deviations away
from the remaining mean and median and may be outliers. Eliminating the performance of
subject four shows a consistent decision distance gap significant at the 1% level. It would
appear that pilots are able to make the decision to abort the approach at an earlier point
using the 2-Level display vice the Single Icon. The Fmap, like the 2-Level Icon, showed a
similar trend versus the Single Icon but to a less significant degree. No trend was noted
between the Fmap and 2-Level Icon.
5.5 Subjective Measures
During the course of the experiment and after completion of all runs, pilots were
asked to evaluate what the display in use had been telling them and how did they perceive
the windshear depicted in regard to their aircraft state. Pilots rated each display (from 1-
POOR to 4-BEST) in eight categories during the sets of approaches and then ranked them
(1, 2, 3 in descending order) after the experiment. In this way, it was hoped to gain a
second source of the same information and note trends in preference.
5.5.1 Paired Comparisons of Pilot Rankings
With six pilots, a display may be considered significantly better in one category
when at least five of the respondents ranked it higher than the alternative display [Yang,
1992, Hogg and Ledolter, 1992].
m Fmap Better B Single Icon Better
Aid in Hazard Avoidance
Best at Immediate Alert
Hazard Location
Trend Indications
Least Confusing
Pertinency of Info
Amount of Info
Understandability
0 2 4 6
Subjects
Figure 5.6 Display Traits -- Fmap vs Single Icon: Trend, hazard
location and the information rows all seem to favor the use of the Fmap.
As shown in Figure 5.6, the Fmap was highly favored in three important areas:
trend, hazard location and pertinent information presented. One pilot stated that, "It gave a
broader presentation." Another said the Fmap, "Suggested more of a course of action."
The Single Icon did not appear to carry as much credibility and pilots attempted to look for
corroborating evidence in the way of glideslope deviations and wind vectors. In the middle
of one run a pilot said, "I'm having to look for information..." using the Single Icon.
m Single Icon Better M 2-Level Icon Better
Aid in Hazard Avoidance
Best at Immediate Alert
Hazard Location
Trend Indications
Least Confusing
Pertinency of Info
Amount of Info
Understandability
0 2 4 6
Subjects
Figure 5.7 Display Traits -- Single Icon vs 2-Level Icon: The
2-Level Icon appears to have the advantage in five of the eight categories,
although not in the prime category of hazard location.
The fact that the 2-Level Icon is just a Single Icon with more information appealed
to the pilots' general desire to know more (see Figure 5.7). It was significantly better in
their eyes particularly because of the "early warning" [yellow area] that something was
brewing and the general sense of the extent of the windshear area. Two comments were:
"Gives the pilot a 'heads-up' alert."
"Much more information, but only slightly more confusing [than the Single
Icon]."
* Fmap Better ; 2-Level Icon Better
Aid in Hazard Avoidance
Best at Immediate Alert
Hazard Location
Trend Indications
Least Confusing
Pertinency of Info
Amount of Info
Understandability
0 2 4 6
Subjects
Figure 5.8 Display Traits -- Fmap vs 2-Level Icon: With a fairly
even distribution, pilots showed no particular preference between these two
displays.
Pilots ranked both the Fmap and the 2-Level Icon higher in significant numbers but
were essentially divided when choosing between the two, as illustrated in Figure 5.8.
There were advocates on both sides:
"Fmap gives much more of a feel for where it is specifically located as
opposed to just going to run into it."
"Multilevel Icon had the best attributes of both the other systems."
The predominant theme of the responses was that the multilevel formats were
superior because they imparted more information sooner to the aircrew. One pilot did
remark that, "Maybe the 2-Level Icon was giving you something that you don't need..."
but even his scores reflected a preference the 2-Level format. A caveat to this idea is that
the pilots were not under a dark night, IMC type workload in the part-task simulator. A
more quantitative consideration of the overall preference was completed using the AHP
method.
5.5.2 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Results
The primary advantage of the AHP method is that it can provide meaningful
quantitative results using a small sample size. Unlike the simple rankings taken over the
categories and then compared as pairs, the AHP method requires a broader scale
comparison in pairs to arrive at a summary of the whole system. Subjects rank two
displays on a scale that involves relative ratings. These relative ratings are described as
"worse," "same," "slightly better," etc. rather than dealing in absolutes such as "bad" or
"excellent."
Ranking
2-Level Fmap Fmap 0.42162-Level FmapIcon 42%
46%
Single Icon 0.1250
Single Icon 2-Level Icon 0.4539
12%
Figure 5.9 Overall Pilot Preference Determined Through AHP
In this particular case we have only three displays and, therefore, need only three
paired rankings. The subject's preference between, say, displays A and B can be thought
of as a vector in the two dimensions of AB space. By finding two more such vectors, the
three-dimensional summary of these preferences can be determined. The result of the
applied AHP is seen in Figure 5.9. The 2-Level Icon and Fmap take the lion's share of the
pilots' expressed preference with little difference between them. This compares favorably
with the results of the previous section.
5.6 Discussion
5.6.1 Pilot Expectations
Pilots seemed receptive to the explanation of F-factor and the different formats that
might be used to display such data. They were genuinely interested in having some form
of airborne detector to confirm ground-based sensors or to determine the form and danger
level of announced advisories from tower and PIREP's. They did not expect to be the first
to discover a microburst, probably due to past experience or the lack thereof .
All pilots tested thought that the ability to display windshear was important and
should, if possible, be done in conjunction with the EHSI data without impairing the
EHSI-weather combination. They were generally receptive to an iconic overlay or time-
sharing scheme, if the warning was reliable.
5.6.2 Reflectivity Display Clarity
The pilots were almost unanimous in their praise for the weather radar presented
with the one caveat that, "it just wouldn't look that good down low." Aircraft radar images
look very similar to the simulated version but require constant adjustment at low altitude to
maintain a quality image. In normal approach operations there is not enough time for this
fine tuning. Hence, the lack of ground clutter and the perfect "antenna tilt" made the
missed approach decision in Scenario III a foregone conclusion without regard to
windshear aspects (see Figure 5.10). Typical comments include:
"As radar deteriorates [at low altitude], the windshear display would come
into play."
"Less clear weather radar makes the shear more important."
As an aside, this does point to a realistic workload measurement, the tuning of a mildly
unstable radar display, as a sidetask device for future experiments.
Figure 5.10 Reflectivity from Scenario III: Microburst reflectivity
from the July 7, 1990 Orlando microburst (foreground), evidently too
intense and too well presented to fly through.
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5.6.3 Straight vs. Turning Missed Approaches
Surprisingly, it was found that the majority of pilots who elected to make a missed
approach were not turning to avoid the displayed microburst hazard, but rather executed a
straight-ahead abort. In past experiments (Wanke and Hansman, 1992, Oseguera and
Hinton, 1993), pilots tended to avoid any displayed icon although it may not have saved
them any energy and could have had dire consequences in the ATC area in regards to other
aircraft and terrain.
In addition to the large area of hazardous windshear in Scenario I, the distance at
which the hazard first became evident to the pilots may have been a contributing cause in
both scenarios. In the Wanke/Hansman [1992] simulation, subjects had a large lead time to
view the microburst alert(s) since the alert generated was predicated on ground-based
detectors. The mean distance from the microburst at which a missed approach occurred
was 4.26 nm. In this experiment, hazardous windshear began to appear between three and
six nautical miles from the aircraft position, resulting in much shorter distances to the
microburst at missed approach. Pilots, therefore, may be more inclined to follow the
straight out missed approach procedures designed for an aircraft already in windshear.
With an airborne detector-based system, the proposed requirements for long range
predictive windshear systems are out to three nautical miles and 25 degrees either side of
the nose. The appearance of hazards in the three to six mile range in this experiment were
in line with these minimums and the nominal detection distances expected by the
manufacturers of such equipment.
5.6.4 Ground-Air Combined Displays
Ground-based windshear detection devices have become more commonplace and
sophisticated than the rarities they were a few years ago. The measurements from such a
source are likely to be more accurate, highly-processed, and well-studied by ground
experts. This alternative resource of information may be datalinked up to aircraft for
display. If fusion of the two detection sources is to be easily accomplished, it will have to
be along the lines of an iconic format.
5.6.5 Decision Distances and Pilot Motives
3.0-
2.0
S 1.0
0.0
Fmap Single Icon 2-Level Icon
Display Type
Figure 5.11 Means of Decision Distances in Scenario I
Although this graph is made across all subjects and is based upon a low sample
number, 10 missed approaches total, it may be indicative of tendencies seen in the sections
prior. The graph of mean decision distances for Scenario II in Figure 5.11 shows the
apparent trend of multilevel formats (Fmap and 2-Level Icon) to have pilots make a quicker
decision (i.e. at a further distance from microburst). It is also interesting to note that
although pilots flew closer in towards the microburst with the Single Icon, they did not see
the diminishing trend any better and aborted at the same rate.
In previous experiments pilots were inclined to avoid higher intensity areas by
greater distances. If the addition of the yellow alert level was perceived as a more "intense"
hazard or just a "bigger" microburst because of its additional area, it is conceivable that
pilots would make their decisions or decide to stay further away from the microburst. This
interpretation of a larger threat is in conflict with the idea of a quicker assimilation of the
threat. The latter appears to be more likely for a couple reasons. First, if the larger threat
hypothesis was true, one would expect to have seen significantly more missed approaches
in Scenario II using the multilevel formats than with the Single Icon -- we did not. Second,
in accordance with previous experiments and as discussed in Section 5.6.3, a larger threat
would likely have resulted in more avoidance turns in Scenarios I and II despite the short
warning time. Such a trend was not observed. A majority of pilots stated that the
multilevel formats did make them aware of potential problems earlier so that they "could
start thinking about them." It is also possible that the multilevel formats yielded better trend
information but this advantage was offset by the perception of a larger threat. This would
explain the lack of a significant difference in number of aborts in Scenario II. However,
the combination of these two characteristics logically would have produced a wide disparity
in decision distance in Scenario I. This was not the case, therefore, it appears that
multilevel formats simply provide a slight advantage in conveying the windshear threat to
the pilot.
5.6.6 Aircraft Velocity and the Hazard Calculation
The fundamental dependence of F-factor upon the aircraft's speed allows the
display to directly reflect the amount of hazard at that instant. However, as a predictive
display of windshear, it can be deceiving during the transitional speed changes of the low-
level environment. Aircraft on approach may be better served by a "more predictive"
display using a reference speed the aircraft will be slowing to as it nears the runway and its
final configuration. An example of this might be use of the "Bug" speed set for approach
during descent checks.
5.6.7 Windshear Warning Audible
A number of pilots expressed the opinion that the windshear warning audible was
too similar in nature to that of the reactive alert. They believed that a potential source of
confusion could be removed by avoiding the use of the word "windshear" in predictive
systems, reserving this for the reactive system.
6. Conclusions
A simulation experiment was performed to examine the issues and effects of three
airborne-measured windshear display formats on aircrew performance in a number of
realistic scenarios.
Experimental results indicate few clear differences in objective performance
improvement between the Fmap, Single Icon, and the 2-Level Icon. All three
displays provided equivalent windshear safety margins in the situations presented.
There were some indications of a slight gain in missed approach decision-making
when using the multilevel formats, with a preference for the 2-level icon.
Subjective results indicate that pilots favor a multilevel format in terms of the ability
to convey pertinent information and trends. The Fmap was perceived to be better at
showing hazard location while adding another intensity level to the Single Icon was
thought to help in hazard avoidance.
The subject ratings between displays, the unanimous overall preference, and the
pilots' evaluations of key traits (Hazard Location, Hazard Avoidance, Trend) all
point towards a subjective preference of the multilevel formats.
In summary, although pilots seemed to like the multi-level formats better, they
didn't appear to need it. Performance differences being slight, the currently proposed
Single Icon format appears adequate for the display of windshear.
Appendix A
This appendix contains representative documentation of the scenarios developed for
the airborne-detected windshear display experiment to include approach plates and ATC
controller guidelines. The overall test matrix for the experiment is shown in Table A. 1 at
the end.
Scenario I -- Version 3
(1_3) STRAIGHT-IN TO A MISSED APPROACH
BUILDING MICROBURST CELLS
Airport:
Approach:
Initial Posit:
Route:
Missed App:
Clinton Int'l, Hillary, AK
ILS Rwy 9R
10nm west of WHITE (IAF)
HDG: 088 ALT: 7000' SPD: 250 WIND:
WHITE - INALE - WATER
CLIMB straight ahead to 3000', then climbing LEFT turn to
5,000', outbound via MIT VOR r-360 to SLICK and hold.
ATIS: "Clinton International Airport information 'MIKE.' 0220 Zulu. Weather: 7500
scattered, estimated ceiling 12,000 broken, visibility one zero miles. Temperature
74, dew point 54. Wind 270 at 4. Altimeter two niner niner six. Runway 9L
inoperative due to construction. Expect ILS approach to runway 9R. Departing
runway 9R. Microburst and low level windshear advisories are in effect. All
aircraft advise on initial contact you have information 'MIKE."'
@ Check-in: " 123, Little Rock Approach. ILS approach to runway 9R in use.
(MIKE is current.) Altimeter two niner niner six. Proceed direct WHITE, descend
and maintain 3000. Report established. Call commencing."
@ Established call or at INALE: "Roger.
runway 9R. Contact Eastern Tower on
@ Check-in: " 123, Tower, roger.
Runway 9R, cleared to land."
You are cleared for the ILS Approach
123.35 and report the outer marker."
ILS to runway 9R. Wind 080 at 5.
ATIS Arrival 119.85
LITTLE ROCK Approach (R) 128.7
Clinton Tower Rwy 9R127L 119.2
.Rwy 9L27R 119.6
Ground Rwy 9R27L 121.8
Rwy 9L127R 121.25
MONDO
Rose, Inc. (Pvt)
0 2853'
2901'
3600
3600
CLT
118.6
D19.5
2790'
*2815'
02761' 42698'
-5 NM
4476'
3433'S2803'
HILLARY, ARK
CLINTON, INTL
ILS Rwy 9R
SA LOC 111.1 ICLT
tOM Apt E/v 2526'
1800
LICK
2950
JJD
114.5
2834'
WH/TE
D 14.4 ICL ILS
GS 6500'(3976') INALE
6500' 
- 5102'(2578')
(D4200' (1976') when
directed by ATC.
WA TER
070 ICLT/LS
GS 4159'(1635')
MM
GS 2560'(126')
•~i . IM
. I- .1GS 2587'(63')
/CLT /LS TCH53'
TDZE RWY9L2526'
4.8 TDZE RWY9R2524'
0.4 APT. 2526'
MISSED APPROACH:Climb to 3000' then climbing LEFT turn to 5000' outbound
via CLT VOR R- 360 to SLICK INT/D15.0 CLT and hold.
STRAIGHT-IN LANDING RWVSR SIDESTEP
ILS LOC (GS out) LANDING RWY 9L
OH 2724' (200) OH 2774'( 250') MDA 2940'(4169 MDA2940'4?)
TDZ or MM out D
FULL CL out ALS out MM out ALS out ALS out
RVR 18 RVR 24 RVR 40 RVR 24 RVR 40 RVR 60 R VR 11/2
or 1 2 or 1 2 or 3/4 or 1/2 or 3/4 or 11/ 4  or 1
Gnd speed-Kts 70 90 100 120 1401t60
GS 3 00 377 485 538 646 754 861 Localizer unusable inside
MAP at 1 .8 I.ANM.r or rul.nvav threshold.
",''TER t -o V' '? I ? . - n7 7 ( i 1: 57 . . .
I
Scenario II -- Version 1
(2_1) DOG-LEG APPROACH
DIMINISHING MICROBURST CELLS
Airport: Johnson Int'l, Brownsville, TX
Approach: ILS Rwy 13L
Initial Posit: 10nm east north of LA SALLE
HDG: 180 ALT: 4000' SPD: 250 WIND:?
Route: LA SALLE - PENTX - MUULE
Missed App: Climb to 500', then climbing LEFT turn to 4000' outbound via JON
VOR R-040 to PDK VOR and hold.
ATIS: "This is Johnson International Airport information 'HOTEL,' time recorded, 0240
Zulu. Johnson weather: measured ceiling 700 foot overcast, visibility 5 miles.
A line of thunderstorms exists extending from 20 miles southwest of Brownsville
to Corpus Christi, Texas moving east at 15 knots. Microburst and low level
windshear advisories are in effect.
The temperature is 69, dew point 67; wind 150 at 12, gusts to 21 knots. Altimeter
29.82.
-- Expect vectors to an ILS approach runway 13L. Landing and departing runway
13L.
-- Braking action reported fair to good by a DC-9.
-- Advise on initial contact that you have 'HOTEL.'"
@ Check-in: "Roger Flight 123, Harlegin Approach. Continue direct LA
SALLE. Descend and maintain 3000'. Expect clearance on the ILS for 13L at LA
SALLE. Altimeter 29.82.
@ LA SALLE: " 123, Approach, descend and maintain 3700' until
established on the localizer. Cleared ILS approach, runway 13L. Contact Johnson
Tower now on 119.8"
@ Inm from localizer: " 123, continue descent to 2700', report
established."
(Expect possible pilot requests to maintain heading, take a vector due to weather -- Clear it
accordingly.)
@ Check-in: " 123, Tower, roger. Runway 13L. Last aircraft to land
reported braking action good about 10 minutes ago. Report the Outer Marker"
@ MUULE after report: "Roger, 123, wind 100 at 8, gusting to 15.
Cleared to land runway 13L."
ATIS Arrival 128.72 (NE) 117.7
(sw) 115.4
HARLEGIN Approach 127.4
JOHNSON Tower 119.1
Ground 121.9
16,24 A
A 2500'
BROWNSVILLE , TX
JOHNSON INTL
,) ILS Rwy 13L
LOC 110.1 IKTL
PADLOK
116.6 PDK
2460'
ILS DME
/0400
5NM
1098
MUULE
D06. I K /LS
MISSED APPROACH
D.7
6 (76.. : -)
:Climb to 500' then climbing LEFT turnto 400'
via JON VOR R-040 to PDK VOR and hold.
STRAIGHT-IN LANDING RWV 13L C
ILS LOC (GS out)
I H261 s25o') MDA 600' (589')
ALS out MM out jALS out M
RVR 24
or12
Radar required.
O' outbound
IRCLE-TO-LAN
600'(89') -1112
Scenario III -- Version 1
(3_1) BOXED PATTERN FROM HOLDING
SNAPSHOT MICROBURST
Airport: Murmanburg Int'l, Murmanburg, W VA
Approach: ILS Rwy 18
Initial Posit: ABDUL (Holding fix)
HDG: 035 ALT: 7000' SPD: 250 WIND:?
Route: ABDUL - GALLE (IAF) - KROSS - MIXIN
Missed App: CLIMB to 1800', then climbing RT to 4000' out the MMG
VOR r-289 to ABDUL (D17.0) and hold as depicted.
ATIS: "This is Murmanburg International Airport information 'ALPHA,' time 0000 Zulu.
Murmanburg weather: 1200 foot scattered, measured ceiling 2000 overcast,
visibility 4 in rainshowers. Occasional ceiling 1200 foot broken, visibility 2 miles
in rain and fog.
The temperature is 69, dew point 67; wind 180 at 11, gusting to 18 knots.
Altimeter two niner seven niner. Numerous thundershowers in the vicinity.
Microburst and low level windshear advisories are in effect.
-- Expect vectors to an ILS approach runway 18. Landing and departing runway
18.
-- Use caution near Bravo Concourse due to construction.
-- Advise on initial contact that you have 'ALPHA."'
@ Check-in: "Roger Flight 123, Murmanburg Approach. Continue direct
GALLE. At pilot's discretion, descend and maintain 5000'. Altimeter 29.80.
Expect ILS approach runway 18.
(Expect pilot to ask for clearance to deviate for weather, vector aircraft heading 040 until
clear and then back to Galle to square corner.)
@ 3nm prior to KROSS: " 123, turn right heading 090 to intercept the
localizer. Descend to 2800'."
@ 30 seconds later: " 123, turn right now heading 160 degrees until
established."
@ Established call: " 123, Murmanburg Approach, you are cleared ILS
approach runway 18.
@ 2nm prior to MIXIN: " 123, switch Murmanburg Tower 121.0."
@ Check-in: " 123, Tower, roger. ILS to runway 18. Braking action
reported fair to good. Call MIXIN."
@ MIXIN after report: "Roger, 123, you are cleared to land runway 18.
Wind 170 at 10 gusts to 18."
ATIS Arrival (NW)
(SE) 119.4117.6
LEWISBURG Approach (R) 121.25
MURMANBURG Tower 121.0
Ground 121.8
RMANBURG, W VA
MURMANBURG INTL
ILS Rwy 18
MSA LOC 109.8 IMMG
00 ADB APt. Elev 1248'
4256'9
4567'
5 NM
'1641'
1485'
A 2970'
3580o 2700
BOO
269
12.2
116.1
2647'
A 3114'
-MURMANBUR
D 116.1 MMG(L)
TCH 59'
4.1 TDZE 1240'
4.6 0.5 0 APT.1248'
MISSED APPROACH: Climb to 1800', then climbing RIGHT turn to 4000' outbound
via MMG VOR R-289 to ABDUL INT/D17.0 and hold.
STRAIGHT-IN LANDING RWY18 ..... . ...
ILS
Ion1490'(250')
LOC (GS out)
MDA 1800' (50')
Table A.1 Overall Test Matrix
DISPLAY TYPE
Fmap
Single Level Icon
2-Level Icon
SCENARIO
0 -- No microburst
1 -- Straight-in to MAP
2 -- Dog-leg, diminishing
3 -- Box-pattern to MAP
VERSION
1
2
3
R SUBJECT NUMBER
U 1 2 3 4 5 6
N
1 S-Icon 1 2 Fmap 1 1 S-Icon 2 1 M-Icon 0 3 M-Icon 1 2 Fmap 1 2
2 31 32 03 1 1 21 33
3 01 23 32 22 33 21
4 21 02 12 32 01 02
5 M-Icon 1 3 S-Icon 0 3 Fmap 1 3 S-Icon 3 3 Fmap 2 3 M-Icon 0 3
6 22 21 31 01 32 23
7 33 13 23 12 03 1 1
8 03 31 02 21 11 3 2
9 Fmap 0 2 M-Icon 1 2 M-Icon 1 1 Fmap 1 3 S-Icon 0 2 S-Icon 1 3
1 11 01 22 02 13 01
11 23 22 0 1 23 22 22
12 32 3 3 33 31 31 31
Preflight, Inflight, Postflight Questions
Appendix B contains the pre-experiment documentation and post-experiment
questionnaire.
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT
HAZARDOUS WINDSHEAR DISPLAY STUDY
Research Assistant: Principal Investigator:
Mark T. Salzberger Prof. R. John Hansman
MIT Rm. 37-458 MIT Rm. 33-113
77 Massachusetts Ave. 77 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02139 Cambridge, MA 02139
You may halt the experiment at any time and withdraw from the study for any reason
without prejudice. You will remain anonymous in any report which describes this work.
If you have any questions concerning the purpose, procedures, or risks associated with this
experiment, please ask them.
CONSENT
In the unlikely event of physical injury resulting from participation in this research, I
understand that medical treatment will be available from the M.I.T. Medical Department,
including first aid, emergency treatment and follow-up care as needed, and that my
insurance carrier may be billed for the cost of such treatment. However, no compensation
can be provided for medical care apart from the foregoing. I further understand that
making such medical treatment available, or providing it, does not imply that such injury is
the Investigator's fault. I also understand that by my participation in this study, I am not
waiving any of my legal rights*.
I understand that I may also contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use of
Humans as Experimental Subjects, M.I.T. 253-6787, if I feel I have been treated unfairly
as a subject.
I volunteer to participate in this experiment which is to involve using simulated sensor
images on a computer screen for a total of 3.0 hours. I understand that I may discontinue
my participation at any time. I have been informed as to the nature of this experiment and
the risks involved, and agree to participate in the experiment.
Date Signature
* Further information may be obtained by calling the Institute's Insurance and Legal Affairs
Office at 253-2822.
Appendix B
Background Information
Information concerning your aviation background will help us to more accurately
assess some of the variables that affect your preferences for weather and windshear
information. All information you provide will remain completely anonymous.
Personal Data / Miscellaneous Information
1. Age: Sex: Male( ) Female( )
2. How were you initially trained to fly? Civil ( ) Military ( )
3. Experience:
A. Total pilot hours Position: Capt. 1st Officer
B. Pilot ratings held:
Fixed Wing: ATP ( ) Commercial Pilot ( ) F.E. Written ( )
Rotary Wing: ATP ( ) Commercial Pilot ( ) Other
C. Types of Aircraft -- Primary Others
D. Weather radar depictions are displayed on: (circle one)
The EHSI A separate monitor Both
C. What percentage of time would you estimate that you have landed/taken off in:
0-10% 10-25 25-50 >50%
IMC weather (excluding night only) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Areas with frequent thunderstorms [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Areas known for [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
wind shear / microbursts
never a few often too often
0 1-5 5-25 > 25
How many times have you encountered
Moderate low level wind shear [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Severe low level wind shear [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
A known microburst [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Best story? Please describe the most encounter (i.e. max airspeed loss,
altitude loss, location, your altitude/configuration/speed, etc.).
INFLIGHT QUESTIONS
1. Is the microburst a hazard to your flight?
2. What do you consider the most threatening aspect at this point in time?
POST-SCENARIO QUESTIONS
(after each display set of four approaches)
1. How would you rate the weather as a hazard to your flight prior to any deviations?
2. What made you deviate / go MAP / stay on course?
3. Did the intensity seem to be increasing / staying the same / decreasing?
4. Any remaining questions in your mind using this display?
5. Did you change anything on the approach given the display and, if so, what?
6. Rate from 1 to 4 the effectiveness of each type of graphic format in regards to:
BEST (1 2 3 or 4) WORST
SINGLE 2-LEVEL
FMAP ICON ICON
Understandability
Amount of information conveyed
Confusion factor
Trend information
(intensity, direction of travel)
Location of hazard
General trust
POST-FLIGHT QUESTIONNAIRE
1. How useful was the initial briefing on wind shear procedures?
2. Did you learn anything new from that briefing?
If yes, what stands out most?
What else should be incorporated into it?
How desirable is a wind shear display?
Rank the graphic formats (1 is best, 3 worst) as to
Fmap
which is best at:
Single
Icon
2-Level
Icon
Understandability
Amount of information conveyed
Confusion factor
Trend information
(intensity, direction of travel)
Location of hazard
General trust
Fmap
Single
Icon
-------------------
2-Level
Icon
Alerting you to the
immediate threat
Conveying pertinent information
Aiding in hazard avoidance
5. Which format would you prefer given a:
90 degree turn to short final.
Time critical situation (e.g. at 2nm).
Long range warning (e.g. at 8nm).
6. Which type of format do you prefer overall?
7. Does airborne weather radar need to be on the same display for correlation?
8. Suggestions?:
The AHP Method
Appendix C contains information on the Analytical Hierarchy Process with
examples of the three paired comparison sheets.
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)
The Analytical Hierarchy Process or AHP was used in this study to produce a
subjective ranking of the three windshear display formats. The AHP is able to provide
quantitative results with a small number of subjects (in this case six) based on paired
comparisons of the displays. Where common statistical methods produce only a relative
ranking, the AHP yields a ranking with a measure of the relative "distance" between the
subject compared. The AHP was developed by Saaty (1980) and has been used in a wide
variety of applications including strategic planning, decision analysis, and engineering
design. A short explanation on the applicability and use of AHP can be found in Mitta
[1993] and Yang [1994].
With n displays to compare, all possible pairs must be considered. Thus each
subject must make n(n - 1) / 2 comparisons. In this case n is three so each subject makes
3(3-1)/2 = 3 paired comparisons.
The result of a set of three comparisons from one subject is placed in a matrix. The
three items or displays to be compared are set up as in Figure C. 1. Using the comparison
sheets, a degree of favorability can be ascertained by assigning the relative ratings a value
(refer to the comparison sheets that follow). For instance, "SAME" equates to 1,
"SLIGHTLY BETTER" = 3, "BETTER" = 5, and so forth. These are placed into the
matrix such that if the row item is ranked higher, say "MUCH BETTER" = 7, a value of 7
is placed in that row at the position corresponding to the column variable with which it was
compared. If the column item is given this higher ranking, then the reciprocal (1/7) is
placed in this spot. The opposite occurs above the diagonal. Of course the comparison of
an item with itself is equal to one, therefore the diagonal is the identity matrix. In the first
row of the example, the Fmap is "Much Better" (7) than the Single Icon, and between
"Slightly Better" and "Better" over the 2-Level Icon.
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Fmap 1 7 4
Single Icon 1/7 1 1/3
2-Level Icon 1/4 3 1
Figure C.1 Example of AHP Subject Matrix: Compiled from
subject's relative ratings of each pair of display types. If the row is
dominant, then the corresponding favorable high value is assigned in the
appropriate column; the reciprocal is assigned otherwise.
The largest eigenvalue and its associated eigenvector (absolute value) are found
through standard mathematical methods for each subject's preference vector. These are
normalized to add up to 1.0. They are then placed in columns to form an n x N matrix,
where N equals the number of subjects. This matrix multiplies a weighted subject vector
(N x 1), similarly normalized, to produce a resultant group preference, the sum of which
totals to 1.0. The "weighted" subject matrix may have equal values for each subject, but it
is another tool for classification of how reliable the data from certain subjects may be
compared to others. In this case all subjects were weighted equally with a value of 1/6
each.
Table B.1 Windshear
Subject comparison values
Display Experiment AHP Comparison:
and associated eigenvalues and eigenvectors.
SUBJ #1 Single 2-Level Fmap Eigen- Eigen-
value vector
Single 1 1/7 1/8 0.0514
2-Level 7 1 1/7 3.3762 0.1965
Fmap 8 7 1 0.7520
#2
Single 1 1/9 1/6 0.0484
2-Level 9 1 9 3.3674 0.7917
Fmap 6 1/9 1 0.1598
#3
Single 1 1/5 1/7 0.2331
2-Level 5 1 8 3.2470 0.7125
Fmap 1/7 1/8 1 0.0544
#4
Single 1 1/5 1/7 0.0647
2-Level 5 1 1/6 3.2400 0.1992
Fmap 7 6 1 0.7360
#5
Single 1 17 1/7 0.0554
2-Level 7 1 1/7 3.4357 0.2027
Fmap 7 7 1 0.7418
#6
Single 1 1/3 5 0.2969
2-Level 3 1 5 3.1356 0.6175
Fmap 1/5 1/5 1 0.0856
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)
HEAD-TO-HEAD
PAIRED
COMPARISONS
FMAP
4
SINGLE ICON -a
RANKING
FMAP 0.4216
SINGLE ICON 0.1250
2-LEVEL ICON 0.4539
2-LEVEL ICON
The higher the ratio,
the stronger the display
Figure C.2 AHP Comparative Results
(format courtesy of Yang, 1994)
F-MAP vs SINGLE ICON
Which is the "better" display - F-Map or Single Icon?
Use the scale below to indicate the degree in which one display is better than the other.
F-MAP better SINGLE ICON better
II
SINGLE ICONF-MAP
absolutely
better
much
better
better slightly
better
Why?
same slightly
better
better much
better
absolutely
better
I
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
SINGLE vs MULTI-LEVEL ICON
Which is the "better" display - Single or Multi-Level Icon?
Use the scale below to indicate the degree in which one display is better than the other.
SINGLE ICON better MULTI-LEVEL ICON better
II
SINGLE ICON
absolutely
better
much
better
better slightly
better
same slightly
better
better much
better
I I I I
MULTI-
LEVEL ICON
absolutely
better
Why?
i00
o
MULTI-LEVEL ICON vs F-MAP
Which is the "better" display - Multi-Level Icon or F-Map?
Use the scale below to indicate the degree in which one display is better than the other.
MULTI-LEVEL ICON better F-MAP better
I -
MULTI-
LEVEL ICON
absolutely
better
much
better
better slightly
better
same slightly
better
better
Why?
much
better
F-MAP
absolutely
better
Resultant Data
This appendix contains the data compiled from objective and subjective measures
used in the windshear display experiment.
Key: Display --
Tables D.1 Objective Measures by Subject
F = Fmap Direction -- LT =-1
S = Single Icon RT = 1
M = 2-Level Icon STR = 0
Applies to Hold Direction &
Microburst Side (when present)
Run Posit Display Scen Vers Appr Dec Dx 1st on LT Hold MB
# Abort? (nm) (nm) STR Dir Side
RT
1 Capt S I 2 Y 1.2 5.00 0 -1 - 1
2 Capt S III 1 Y 1 0
3 Capt S 0 1 N 1
4 Capt S II 1 N 3.08 -1 0
5 Capt M I 3 Y 2.0 5.50 0 - 1 - 1
6 Capt M 11 2 Y 2.7 2.93 0 - 1 0
7 Capt M III 3 Y 1 0
8 Capt M 0 3 N - 1
9 Capt F 0 2 N 1
1 0 Capt F I 1 Y 3.0 3.50 0 - 1 - 1
1 1 Capt F 11 3 Y 2.8 2.95 0 - 1 0
1 2 Capt F III 2 Y 1 0
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Run Posit Display Scen Vers Appr Dec Dx 1st on LT Hold MB
# Abort? (nm) (n m) STR Dir Side
RT
1 Ist Off F I 1 Y 1.2 4.76 0 - 1 - 1
2 Ist Off F III 2 Y 1 0
3 1st Off F II 3 N 2.80 - 1 0
4 1st Off F 0 2 0 1
5 1st Off S 0 3 N - 1
6 Ist Off S II 1 Y 2.2 2.80 - 1 - 1 0
7 1st Off S I 3 Y 1.3 2.70 1 - 1 - 1
8 1st Off S III 1 Y 1 0
9 1st Off M I 2 Y 2.5 4.00 1 - 1 - 1
10 Ist Off M 0 1 0 1
1 1 1st Off M II 2 N 2.80 - 1 0
12 1st Off M III 3 Y 1 0
Run Posit Display Scen Vers Appr Dec Dx 1st on LT Hold MB
# Abort? (nm) (n m) STR Dir Side
RT
1 Capt S II 1 Y 2.4 2.93 0 -1 0
2 Capt S 0 3 N -1
3 Capt S III 2 Y 1 0
4 Capt S I 2 Y 1.2 5.00 0 -1 - 1
5 Capt F I 3 Y 2.0 3.92 0 - 1 - 1
6 Capt F III 1 Y 1 0
7 Capt F I 1 3 N 2.93 0 - 1 0
8 Capt F 0 2 N 1
9 Capt M I 1 Y 1.3 2.00 0 - 1 - 1
1 0 Capt M II11 2 N 3.08 - 1 0
1 1 Capt M 0 1 N 1
12 Capt M III 3 Y 1 0
Run Posit Display Scen Vers Appr Dec Dx 1st on LT Hold MB
# Abort? (nm) (nm) STR Dir Side
RT
1 Capt M 0 3 N - 1
2 Capt M I 1 Y 0.7 1.00 0 - 1 - 1
3 Capt M 11 2 Y 3.0 3.08 -1 - 1 0
4 ICapt M III 2 Y 1 0
5 Capt S III 3 Y 1 0
6 Capt S 0 1 N 1
7 Capt S I 2 Y 3.1 3.31 0 - 1 - 1
8 Capt S II 1 Y 2.4 2.63 0 - 1 0
9 Capt F I 3 Y 2.1 5.60 0 -1 - 1
10 Capt F 0 2 N 1
1 1 Capt F II 3 Y 2.8 2.93 0 -1 0
12 Capt F III 1 Y 1 0
SUB]JE$CT7 #5
Run Posit Display Scen Vers Appr Dec Dx 1st on LT Hold MB
# Abort? (nm) (nm) STR Dir Side
RT
1 Capt M I 2 Y 2.4 4.76 0 - 1 - 1
2 Capt M II 1 Y 2.6 3.01 1 - 1 0
3 Capt M III 3 Y 1 0
4 Capt M 0 1 N 1
5 Capt F II 3 Y 3.0 3.08 1 - 1 0
6 Capt F III 2 Y 1 0
7 Capt F 0 3 N - 1
8 Capt F I 1 Y 1.0 2.60 1 - 1 - 1
9 Capt S 0 2 N 1
10 Capt S I 3 Y 2.0 2.60 0 - 1 -1
1 1 Capt S II 2 N 2.93 - 1 0
12 Capt S III 1 Y 1 0
Run Posit Display Scen Vers Appr Dec Dx 1st on LT Hold MB
# Abort? (nm) (nm) STR Dir Side
RT
1 Ist Off F I 2 Y 1.2 5.37 0 - 1 - 1
2 Ist Off F III 3 Y 0 1 0
3 1st Off F II 1 Y 2.3 3.08 -1 - 1 0
4 1st Off F 0 2 N 1
5 1st Off M 0 3 N - 1
6 Ist Off M II 3 N 2.93 - 1 0
7 1st Off M I 1 Y 2.2 3.50 0 - 1 - 1
8 1st Off M III 2 Y - 1 1 0
9 1st Off S I 3 Y 1.7 5.29 0 - 1 - 1
10 Ist Off S 0 1 N 1
1 1 1st Off S 11 2 N 3.01 - 1 0
12 lst Off S III 1 Y 0 1 0
Subjective Ranking Results by Category
UNDERSTANDABILITY
Subj Fmap Single 2 -
# Icon Level
Icon
1 1st 3rd 2nd
2 2nd 3rd 1st
3 3rd 2nd 1st
4 1st 3rd 2nd
5 1st 3rd 2nd
6 3rd 1st 2nd
HAZARD LOCATION
Subj Fmap Single 2 -
# Icon Level
Icon
1 1st 2nd 3rd
2 2nd 3rd 1st
3 2nd 3rd 1st
4 1st 2nd 3rd
5 3rd 1st 2nd
6 2nd 3rd 1st
Table D.2
AMOUNT OF
INFORMATION
Subj Fmap Single 2 -
# Icon Level
Icon
1 1st 3rd 2nd
2 1st 3rd 2nd
3 2nd 3rd 1st
4 1st 3rd 2nd
5 1st 3rd 2nd
6 2nd 3rd 1st
LEAST CONFUSING
Subj Fmap Single 2 -
# Icon Level
Icon
1 2nd 1st 3rd
2 2nd 3rd 1st
3 3rd 1st 2nd
4 1st 3rd 2nd
5 1st 3rd 2nd
6 3rd 1st 2nd
PERTINENT
INFORMATION
Subj Fmap Single 2 -
# Icon Level
Icon
1 1st 3rd 2nd
2 2nd 3rd 1st
3 2nd 3rd 1st
4 1st 3rd 2nd
5 1st 3rd 2nd
6 2nd 3rd 1st
AID IN HAZARD
AVOIDANCE
Subj Fmap Single 2 -
# Icon Level
Icon
1 1st 3rd 2nd
2 2nd 3rd 1st
3 3rd 2nd 1st
4 1st 2nd 3rd
5 1st 3rd 2nd
6 3rd 2nd 1st
TREND INDICATOR
Subj Fmap Single 2 -
# Icon Level
Icon
1 1st 3rd 2nd
2 2nd 3rd 1st
3 2nd 3rd 1st
4 1st 3rd 2nd
5 3rd 1st 2nd
6 2nd 3rd 1st
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